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FALSE MEMORY AND OBSESSIVE–COMPULSIVE
SYMPTOMS
Heide Klumpp, Ph.D.,1 Nader Amir, Ph.D.,1 and Sarah N. Garfinkel, Ph.D.2
Background: The memory deficit hypothesis has been used to explain the
maintenance of repetitive behavior in individuals with obsessive–compulsive
disorder, yet the majority of studies focusing on verbal memory show mixed
results. These studies primarily evaluated memory accuracy via the inclusion or
omission of previously encountered material, as opposed to false recognition (i.e.,
the inclusion of erroneous material). We evaluated false memories and memory
processes in individuals with obsessive–compulsive washing symptoms (OC),
individuals matched on depression and anxiety without OC symptoms (D/A), and
in nonanxious individuals (NAC). Methods: Twenty-eight OC, 28 D/A, and 29
NAC individuals read OC-threat relevant, positive, and neutral scenarios and
then performed a recognition test. Erroneous recognition of words associated to
encoded, but not previously viewed, scenarios were classified as false memories. To
evaluate processes underlying memory, participants completed a modified
remember/know task to examine whether the OC individuals differed from the
other individuals in recollective clarity for false memories of OC-relevant (e.g.,
germs), positive (e.g., lottery), and neutral (e.g., bread) material. Results: The
OC individuals used ‘‘know’’ more than the D/A and NAC individuals for false
memories of threat. For veridical memories, the OC individuals used ‘‘know’’
more than the NAC, but not, D/A individuals. Conclusions: The greater reliance
on ‘‘know’’ (i.e., feelings of familiarity) in general and false threat memories in
particular in individuals with OC symptoms may add to feelings of uncertainty
for threat-relevant material, which may contribute to compulsive behavior.
Depression and Anxiety 26:396–402, 2009. r2008 Wiley-Liss, Inc.
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INTRODUCTION
Repetitive behaviors such as hand washing or checking
are common in obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD)
with as many as 75% of patients primarily exhibiting
cleaning and/or checking rituals.[1] Hence, it has been
proposed that memory dysfunction in OCD (e.g., poor
episodic recall) serves as a potential mechanism for
eliciting and maintaining certain compulsions.[2–4] How-
ever, evidence regarding the specific nature of OCD
memory impairment is mixed,[5] particularly with regard
to memory for verbal material. Some studies fail to find a
deficit,[6–8] whereas others do not.[9,10]
Lack of consistent results challenges the memory
deficit hypothesis despite the possibility that contra-
dictory findings could stem from differential sensitivity
of paradigms to tap into memory deficits in OCD.
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Rather than persist in the refinement of how true
memories differ as a function of OCD status, research
has begun to incorporate two related yet divergent
issues. One concerns repeated checking consequences
on memory. Excessive checking itself can reduce
recollective clarity without reducing memory accu-
racy.[11–14] Repeated checking is also associated with
reduced recollective clarity and memory confidence
without concomitant reduction in memory accu-
racy.[12,13] Moreover, research suggests that perceived
responsibility is associated with memory distrust in
OCD patients but not in controls[15] highlighting the
role OCD-related cognitions may play in a cycle of
repeated checking and recollection. Although this does
not negate the existence of baseline memory differences
in OCD, it changes the focus of causality rendering the
act of checking itself as responsible for perpetuating the
checking cycle and perhaps OC cognitions.
Another line of research suggests conviction of the
veracity of one’s memories in OCD may be distorted.
Valid memories may constitute high standards in OCD
resulting in heightened distrust of memory traces[12, 16]
that may contribute to, or result from, repeated
checking. These issues raise the possibility that
memory accuracy and memory confidence in OCD
may be a consequence of repetitive behaviors (i.e.,
compulsions), rather than a reflection of inherent
baseline memory deficits in OCD.
OCD memory research to date has predominantly
focused on veridical memory.[8, 17–19] Noticeably, errors
of commission (i.e., false memories) have not been
adequately explored. Although there is no standard
definition of what constitutes a false memory, there is
broad agreement that they occur when ‘‘people believe
that they have experienced an item or event which is
actually novel’’ (p. 392).[20] False memories in OCD are
of particular interest in that differential patterns of false
remembering as a function of OC symptoms could
provide insight into the cognitive deficits associated with
OCD. Additionally, a propensity for heightened false
memories in OCD would be relevant from a therapeutic
perspective if one accepts the premise that false beliefs
and misconceptions founded on false memories may
contribute to OCD.
False memory research shows qualitative differences
between true and false memories. For example, false
memory items have been shown to contain less
auditory detail and fewer remembered reactions and
feelings than true memories.[21] One way of investigat-
ing memory processes that may contribute to false
memories is the remember/know paradigm.[22] This
procedure distinguishes memories based upon famil-
iarity (‘‘know’’) from more detailed recollection
(‘‘remember’’). Although not without controversy,1
remember/know responses are functionally dissoci-
able[25] and a number of false memory researchers
have used this paradigm to examine the differential
contribution of recollection and familiarity underlying
false and veridical memories.[21, 27–31]
An advantage of the paradigm is its ability to
examine the differences in memory processes even
when absolute levels of true memories do not differ.[22]
If memories differ in terms of their recollective clarity,
such that they are based on familiarity and not detailed
recollection, an increase in false memories may
develop, as individuals will be impaired in their ability
to differentiate between true and false memories at
test.[32, 33] It is thus possible for false memories to be
enhanced in individuals with OCD in the absence of
absolute levels of true memory differences. Therefore,
false memories may serve as a more sensitive way of
detecting memory deficits in different populations than
typical recall tasks.
This study evaluated false memories in individuals
with OC washing symptoms (OC group). We
hypothesized that the OC group would exhibit
more false memories for threat than anxious and
nonanxious control groups. This is based on research
showing memory errors may be exacerbated for
information related to one’s interests.[34,35] One ex-
planation for this finding is based on a network
model—namely, concepts related to that area of
interest are strengthened, such that when one concept
is activated, a nonpresented but associated concept is
also activated.[36]
Extrapolating this hypothesis to OCD, preoccupa-
tion for threat may consequently strengthen threat
concepts in an enhanced associative network that is
activated when threat is processed. Indirect evidence of
a network based on such preoccupation includes data,
showing individuals with OCD are quick to detect
threat-relevant information,[37] have difficulty forget-
ting such information,[38, 39] and have memory bias for
threat-relevant material.[8,19] Greater impairment for
forgetting OCD-relevant words[38,39] and greater
memory bias for threat[8,19] in OCD compared with
anxious and nonanxious controls suggests a well-
elaborated, personally relevant network.
We also predicted that the OC group, relative to the
other groups, would report more ‘‘know’’ than ‘‘re-
member’’ responses for falsely recognized threat words
and veridical recognition. This is based on research
showing individuals with OCD prefer their memories
be more vivid than they are[16] and evidence that
repeated checking itself increases ‘‘know’’ responses for
accurate memories.[11–13]
To explore our hypotheses that individuals with OC
washing symptoms will exhibit more false memories for
threat than individuals without OC symptoms and
report more ‘‘know’’ responses for false and veridical
memories, college students with and without OC
washing symptoms were presented with OC threat-
relevant scenarios, positive scenarios, and neutral
1The remember/know procedure assumes that detailed recollection
and familiarity are mutually exclusive consequently leading research-
ers to criticize its validity[23, 24] due to the potential interdependence
of remember and know responses.
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Eighty-five University of Georgia students consented to partici-
pate for partial course credit. We used the Obsessive Compulsive
Inventory (OCI),[40] Beck Depression Inventory (BDI),[41] and the
trait version of Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI)[42]
to classify participants into those who: (1) scored high on the OCI
washing subscale (‘‘OC group’’, n 5 28); (2) scored low on the OCI
measure but matched to the OCI group on depression and general
anxiety (‘‘D/A group’’; n 5 28); and (3) scored low on all measures
(‘‘NAC group’’; n 5 29). A cutoff score of 8 on the OCI washing
subscale was used for the OC group, which mean subscale score
(M 5 15.5) was similar to a treatment-seeking OCD sample
(M 5 11.2)[40] See Table 1.
Groups differed on washing symptoms [F(2, 82) 5 546.97, Po001]
and level of depression [F(2, 82) 5 36.5, Po001] (BDI), state anxiety
[F(2, 82) 5 18.95, Po001], and trait anxiety [F(2, 82) 5 19.44,
Po001] (STAI). Post hoc Bonferroni corrections at a level .05
showed OC and D/A groups were significantly more depressed and
anxious than the NAC group. The OC and D/A groups were similar
in state anxiety, trait anxiety, and depression but differed on OC
symptom levels.
MATERIALS
Two equivalent sets of 13 scenarios were constructed. Each set
contained 5 OCD-relevant, 4 positive and 4 negative scenarios. A
different group of 88 participants, selected at random, rated these
scenarios on a 3 to +3 Likert scale. OC threatening scenarios were
rated as more negative than neutral scenarios and more negative than
positive scenarios.2 (Target words and scenarios are available from the
authors upon request.) In each set, there were 39 (13 scenarios 3
words) target words matched on frequency of word use.[43] Sets were
counterbalanced such that half of the participants from each group
saw only one set of scenarios for encoding. For recognition, the
combined set of 78 target words was presented.
PROCEDURE
Level of emotionality for 13 scenarios was rated and participants
were asked to remember as many words as possible for a later
recognition task. Subsequently, participants performed an unrelated
task for 10 min (i.e., handedness measure). For recognition, instruc-
tions were adapted from a previous study.[31] More specifically,
participants were asked to discriminate between ‘‘old’’ (i.e., previously
presented) and ‘‘new’’ (i.e., not encoded yet thematically related to
presented scenarios) words. For ‘‘old’’ words, participants made
‘‘remember’’ or ‘‘know’’ responses. Veridical recognition was the
identification of an old word as old, whereas false recognition was the
identification of a new, yet thematically related word, as old.
RESULTS
Mean ‘‘remember’’ and ‘‘know’’ responses were
calculated for each scenario type and group; probabil-
ities were based on the total amount rather than the
total amount of items recognized. This allowed for
remember and know responses to be independently
modulated. See Table 2 for results.
Analysis was based on the methods adapted by
another study[31] and similar to other studies,[44,45]
separate analyses were performed for ‘‘remember’’ and
‘‘know.’’ Omnibus analyses were a 3 (Group: OC, D/A,
NAC) 3 (Word Type: Threat, Positive, Neutral)
ANOVA with repeated measurement. All main effects
were submitted to a one-way ANOVA and Bonferroni
corrected tests at a level .05 were used to further
explore differences in group or word type.
TOTAL VERIDICAL RECOGNITION
A main effect of Word Type [F(2, 164) 5 14.74,
Po001] but not Group [F(2, 82) 5 2.78, P 5 07] was
shown; there was no Word TypeGroup interaction
[F(4, 164) 5 05, P 5 99]. All participants remembered
more threat than positive words [t(84) 5 5.0, Po001]
and neutral words [t(84) 5 4.64, Po001]. However,
recognition rate for positive words and neutral words
was similar [t(84) 5 74, P 5 46].
‘‘Remember’’ veridical recognition. We found main effects
of Word Type [F(2, 164) 5 11.91, Po001] and Group
[F(2, 82) 5 3.06, Po05]. However, there was no Word




(n 5 28) (n 5 28) (n 5 29)
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Females 27.6% 41.4% 31.0%
Age 18.7 (0.9) 18.6 (0.9) 19.2 (1.1)
Education 13.3 (1.2) 13.4 (1.0) 13.9 (1.0)
BDI 14.5 (10.1)a 14.8 (5.8)a 1.4 (1.1)b
STT 46.0 (9.6)a 49.4 (9.6)a 35.1 (7.8)b
STS 46.1 (11.2)a 45.9 (8.9)a 32.6 (8.2)b
OCI-washing 15.5 (2.9)a 0.9 (1.0)b 1.0 (1.2)b
BDI, Beck Depression Inventory; STS, Spielberger, State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory, State Version; STT, Spielberger, State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory, Trait Version; OCI, Obsessive Compulsive
Inventory.
aSignificantly different than nonanxious controls (Po.05).
bSignificantly different than OC group (Po.05).
2A group of unselected participants rated OC threat-relevant
scenarios more negatively than positive [t(87) 5 60.57; Po.001] and
neutral [t(87) 5 26.74; Po.001] scenarios. Moreover, positive scenar-
ios were rated as more positive than neutral scenarios [t(87) 5 50.33;
Po.001]. For participants in the experiment, not all completed
ratings (OC, n 5 18; D/A, n 5 16; NAC, n 5 17) Ratings for these
participants were submitted to a 3 (Group: OC, D/A, NAC) 3
(Scenario Type: negative, positive, neutral) ANOVA with repeated
measurement. Results showed a main effect of Scene Type [F(2,
96) 5 1031.14, Po.001] that revealed negative scenes were more
negative than positive [t(50) 5 40.37; Po.001] and neutral
[t(50) 5 16.46; Po.001] scenes. Additionally, positive scenes were
rated as more positive than neutral scenes [t(50) 5 35.63; Po.001].
There was no main effect of Group [F(2, 48) 5 1.53, P 5 23] or
SceneGroup interaction [F(4, 96) 5 1.94, P 5 12].
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TypeGroup interaction [F(4, 164) 5 0.23, P 5 92]. For
Group main effect, post hoc analysis revealed the D/A
group used ‘‘remember’’ more than the OC group
(po05). The NAC group did not differ from the OC
(P 5 53) or D/A group (P 5 79). Participants used
‘‘remember’’ more for threat than positive words
[t(84) 5 4.69, Po001] and neutral words [t(84) 5 3.72,
Po001]. ‘‘Remember’’ for positive and neutral words
was similar [t(84) 5 1.40, P 5 17].
‘‘Know’’ veridical recognition. There was a main effect
of Group [F(2, 82) 5 3.63, Po04] but not Word Type
[F(2, 164) 5 2.04, P 5 13] and there was no Group
Word Type interaction [F(4, 164) 5 47, P 5 76]. Post
hoc analysis showed the OC group used ‘‘know’’ more
than the NAC group (Po04) but not the D/A group
(P 5 14). There was no difference between the D/A and
NAC groups (P 5 87).
TOTAL FALSE MEMORIES
We found main effects of Word Type [F(2, 164) 5 67.68,
Po001] and Group [F(2, 82) 5 3.86, Po03] but there was
no Word TypeGroup interaction [F(4, 164) 5 57,
P 5 69]. Post hoc analysis showed the OC group had
more memory errors than the NAC group (Po03) but not
the D/A group (P 5 85). There was no difference between
the D/A and NAC groups (P 5 12). For Word Type all
participants had more false memories for threat than
neutral words [t(84) 5 10.57; Po001] but not positive
words [t(84) 5 46; P 5 65]. False memory was also greater
for positive than neutral words [t(84) 5 10.23; Po001].
‘‘Remember’’ false memories. There was a main effect of
Word Type [F(2, 164) 5 37.79, Po001] but not Group
[F(2, 82) 5 1.59, P 5 21]; there was no GroupWord
Type interaction [F(4, 164) 5 1.29, P 5 28]. For Word
Type all participants used ‘‘remember’’ more for threat
than neutral words [t(84) 5 8.13; Po001] and more for
positive than neutral words [t(84) 5 7.50, Po001].
There was no difference between threat and positive
words [t(84) 5 73, P 5 47].
‘‘Know’’ false memories. A main effect of Word Type
[F(2, 164) 5 16.82, Po001] was modified by a
GroupWord Type ordinal interaction [F(2,
82) 5 3.74, Po03]. Main effect of Group was close to
significant [F(2, 82) 5 3.01, P 5 06] and was further
explored to reveal the OC group endorsed more
‘‘know’’ false memories, an effect that was approaching
significance relative to the NAC group (P 5 06) but not
the D/A group (P 5 23). There was no difference
between the D/A and NAC groups (P 5 86). However,
breakdown of the significant GroupWord Type
interaction further modified this result, showing the
increase in ‘‘know’’ false memories in the OC group
manifested in threat words only, with the OC group
recognizing significantly more ‘‘know’’ false memories
for threat relative to both the D/A (Po05) and
NAC (Po01) groups. There was no difference
between the D/A and NAC groups (P 5 81). See
Figure 1.
FAMILIARITY INDEX
Assuming familiarity and recollection are indepen-
dent, it follows that some items may be both familiar
and recollected.[23] In accordance with standard
remember/know instructions, participants were told
‘‘know’’ responses should be made only in the absence
of recollection, which may have underestimated the
TABLE 2. Mean recognition rates and standard




Type of group M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Threat total 0.74 (.17) 0.77 (.12) 0.70 (.16)
Remember 0.46 (.22) 0.60 (.18) 0.53 (.18)
Know 0.28 (.22) 0.17 (.17) 0.17 (.13)
Positive total 0.61 (.20) 0.62 (.21) 0.58 (.21)
Remember 0.37 (.21) 0.46 (.23) 0.42 (.21)
Know 0.24 (.18) 0.16 (.13) 0.16 (.14)
Neutral total 0.62 (.20) 0.66 (.18) 0.59 (.20)
Remember 0.40 (.24) 0.49 (.20) 0.46 (.24)
Know 0.22 (.21) 0.17 (.15) 0.13 (.16)
False memories
OC D/A NAC
Type of group M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Threat total 0.45 (.17) 0.44 (.15) 0.34 (.17)
Remember 0.22 (.15) 0.31 (.18) 0.23 (.16)
Know 0.23 (.16) 0.13 (.14) 0.11 (.12)
Positive total 0.43 (.18) 0.41 (.21) 0.36 (.18)
Remember 0.24 (.16) 0.26 (.20) 0.22 (.14)
Know 0.19 (.16) 0.15 (.14) 0.14 (.13)
Neutral total 0.22 (.15) 0.19 (.11) 0.16 (.11)
Remember 0.12 (.13) 0.11 (.10) 0.09 (.11)
Know 0.10 (.11) 0.08 (.08) 0.07 (.09)
Figure 1. ‘‘Know’’ responses for falsely recognized threat words.
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extent to which the OC group relied on ‘‘know’’ for
threat recognition. Hence, we submitted a familiarity
index:[23] F 5 K/(1-R) where ‘‘F’’ denotes false memory,
‘‘K’’ refers to ‘‘know’’ (i.e., feelings of familiarity) and
‘‘R’’ denotes ‘‘remember’’ to planned comparisons (i.e.,
two-tailed independent t-tests at .05 a level) to evaluate
group differences for threat.
‘‘Familiarity Index’’ for veridical recognition. The OC
group had a greater familiarity index for threat words
than the NAC group [t(55) 5 1.98; Po05] but not the
D/A group [t(54) 5 1.49; P 5 14]. The D/A and NAC
groups were similar [t(55) 5 53; P 5 60].
‘‘Familiarity Index’’ for false recognition. The OC group
had a greater familiarity index for threat words relative
to the NAC group [t(55) 5 3.03; Po004] and the D/A
group [t(54) 5 2.22; Po03], however, the NAC and
D/A groups were similar [t(55) 5 84; P 5 41]. See
Table 3.
DISCUSSION
We investigated false recognition and memory
processes (‘‘remember’’, ‘‘know’’) in individuals with
OC washing symptoms (OC group). We hypothesized
that the OC group relative to anxious (D/A) and
nonanxious (NAC) control groups would exhibit more
false memories for threat words and that ‘‘know’’
responses founded upon familiarity would be the
primary memory process contributing to this effect.
This hypothesis was partially supported. The OC
group exhibited more false memories than the NAC
group regardless of word type, yet, no difference
between the OC and D/A groups emerged indicating
individuals with depression and general anxiety may be
vulnerable to making general memory errors. Deficits
associated with depression[46] may have contributed to
this outcome. Consistent with our hypothesis, the OC
group had significantly more ‘‘know’’ responses for
threat false memory items than either the NAC or D/A
groups. These results suggest OC individuals may be
susceptible to enhanced false memories for threat
founded upon familiarity, and that this effect cannot
be solely attributable to depression and general anxiety.
For ‘‘remember’’ responses, all groups showed
enhanced false memories for threat and positive words
relative to neutral words. This is in accordance with
work demonstrating emotional material is more likely
to be ‘‘remembered,’’ without necessarily enhancing
memory accuracy.[47]
For veridical recognition we made no predictions as
verbal memory deficits in OCD have been inconsistent.
Results showed all participants recognized more threat
than positive words and neutral words with no
difference between positive and neutral words. This is
consistent with reports that negative information is
recognized more accurately than positive or neutral
information.[48,49] Group main effects showed the
D/A group used ‘‘remember’’ more than the OC, but
not, the NAC group. In contrast, the OC group used
‘‘know’’ more than the NAC, but not, the D/A group.
This finding, coupled with significantly increased
‘‘know’’ responses in the OC group for threat false
memories relative to the other groups, and the
familiarity index indicating the OC group falsely
recognized threat more than the other groups, suggests
memory differences in individuals with OC symptoms,
particularly for threat, may manifest in terms of
an over-reliance on familiarity, in the absence
of a significant decrement in memories based on
recollection.
Our results suggest a potential ‘‘know’’ response bias
in OCD. Failure to obtain significantly enhanced
‘‘know’’ false memories for positive and neutral words
in the OC group, nor significant reductions in false
memories for threat, neutral, and positive scenarios in
this group, indicates a simple global memory bias is
unlikely. Nevertheless, enhanced veridical ‘‘know’’
memories in the OC group relative to the NAC, but
not, D/A group, and reduced ‘‘remember’’ responses in
the OC group relative to the D/A, but not, NAC group
suggests the OC group may display memory impair-
ments that manifest as a bias toward ‘‘know’’ responses.
This bias in veridical memory could result from the
need for OCD individuals to be more certain before
endorsing a memory. It is also possible that people with
OC symptoms have a deficit in recollective ability or an
over-reliance on familiarity. These explanations are in
accordance with research that implicates verbal recol-
lective impairments in OCD,[50, 51] and a differential
criteria for confidence in OCD.[52] It should be noted,
however, that these impairments have not been
repeatedly observed, and hence further research needs
to be done to reconcile these differences and elucidate
the nature of OCD related impairments.
The finding that OC individuals relied on familiarity
for threat-related false memory indicates there could be
something specific about the nature of the material we
TABLE 3. Familiarity index for mean recognition rates
and standard deviations for obsessive compulsive threat,
positive, and neutral words
Familiarity index
Type of group OC D/A NAC
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Threat
Veridical recognition 0.50 (.30) 0.39 (.26) 0.36 (.26)
False memory 0.28 (.19) 0.18 (.17) 0.14 (.17)
Positive
Veridical recognition 0.37 (.27) 0.33 (.32) 0.27 (.26)
False memory 0.24 (.19) 0.21 (.19) 0.18 (.17)
Neutral
Veridical recognition 0.27 (.26) 0.24 (.26) 0.19 (.26)
False memory 0.11 (.13) 0.09 (.09) 0.08 (.09)
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used. As stated in the introduction, semantic networks
may be different for individuals with OC symptoms,
relative to controls, for threat-related issues. That is,
preoccupation with threat may lead to a well-elabo-
rated network akin to having expertise for OC-relevant
threat. Research suggests expertise results in more
prolific and stronger connections, which increase the
probability of supra-threshold activation of nodes,
leading to greater false memory endorsement.[53]
Additionally, repeated checking itself can serve
to decrease the clarity of memories.[11–14] As the threat
scenarios are highly familiar to individuals
with OC symptoms, such that they performed compul-
sions, then, in accordance with evidence documenting
checking can reduce recollective clarity, it follows
that memories for threat-related scenarios were
largely restricted to the ‘‘know’’ domain in OC
individuals.
In summary, OC individuals appear to rely on
feelings of familiarity, not detailed recollection, parti-
cularly when falsely recognizing threat-relevant words;
the key finding being that individuals in the OC group
were shown to have elevated false ‘‘know’’ memories for
threat words relative to both the D/A and NAC groups
as well as an enhanced familiarity index for falsely
recognized threat words compared to both groups.
Our study has limitations. Results are based on an
analogue OC sample; therefore, data may not general-
ize to clinical OCD. We did not include OC-irrelevant
threat scenarios (e.g., sad words); hence, content-
specificity of false memories between groups was
not evaluated. Additionally, while affective ratings
suggest threat-relevant words were of equal salience
among groups, analysis was underpowered and
words were not amenable to associative strength
evaluation; therefore, we cannot rule out that potential
saliency differences among groups may contribute to
findings. Moreover, we used a traditional remember/
know procedure,[22] but others[24] point out this
procedure fails to account for false remember judg-
ments. Therefore, it may be beneficial to examine false
memories in OCD with models that provide a means to
separately assess levels of both familiarity and recollec-
tion for stimuli. Lastly, OC participants may have used
anti-anxiety medications, and such medications have
been shown to reduce remembering and increase
knowing[54] thus possibly contributing to findings.
Despite limitations, our results suggest feelings of
familiarity for memory errors may play a role in
OCD and further investigation of false memories in
OCD may assist in the debate regarding memory
deficits in OCD.
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